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THEODORE W . RUGER
Plural Constitutionalism and the Pathologies of 
American Health Care
i . america’s two health care constitutions
The United States has two health care constitutions,1 and the old is the 
enemy of the new. The recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act2 (PPACA) is the latest step in the federal government’s incremental efforts
over the past half century to construct and entrench a modern constitution of 
health security similar to those enjoyed by citizens in most other advanced 
democracies. At present, this constitution of health security is wobbly and 
uncertain, embodied in a pastiche of several statutes of various vintages,3
heavily reliant on private employers as the primary insurers for most 
Americans and only halfheartedly embraced by the American public. Yet for all 
1. In a manner similar to Eskridge and Ferejohn, this Essay uses the term “constitution”—
intentionally not capitalized—to refer to foundational structural commitments embodied in 
legal materials outside the canonical “Large ‘C’” materials of formal text and Supreme Court 
doctrine. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE 
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 5 (2010).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
3. These statutes include the PPACA itself, the Medicare and Medicaid enactments of 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 
9121(b), 100 Stat. 82, 164-67 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006)), 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.C.). For discussion of the “patchwork” nature of reform in the United States, see 
Jonathan Oberlander & Theodore Marmor, The Health Bill Explained at Last, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Aug. 19, 2010, at 6.
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of this present uncertainty and complexity, the PPACA stands as a potentially 
transformative policy achievement that may one day come to be regarded, as 
Social Security and Medicare are now, as a central component of the 
“constitution of statutes” that is the subject of William Eskridge and John 
Ferejohn’s splendid new book, A Republic of Statutes: The New American 
Constitution.4
Such a development is hardly inevitable. Like previous episodes of health 
reform in the United States, today’s emerging constitution of health security is 
imperiled by the persistence of a much older constitution of authority in 
American medicine, one that prioritizes individualistic therapeutic choice over 
other more systemic values. The deep roots and wide public acceptance of this 
traditional authority structure provide a ready-made rhetorical toolbox for 
opponents of health reform who mine public misgivings about government or 
corporate interference with therapeutic choice and thereby foster opposition to 
new reform ideas. Relatedly, the durable entrenchment of medicine’s 
individualistic authority regime has continually and repeatedly disabled both 
government and private payors from achieving the cost control and resource 
prioritization necessary for a sustainable universal health security system. Even 
as public and private insurers have financed health care for most Americans 
over the past fifty years, authority over actual medical utilization has remained 
in the hands of individual physicians and their patients. Federal statutes like 
the PPACA and Medicare are carefully solicitous of this decentralized authority 
regime, even while committing to underwrite the rapidly escalating costs of the 
care provided within it.
The simultaneous operation of these two health care constitutions has 
produced a health system that contains a central conceptual inconsistency 
growing more intense with each passing year: it devolves primary authority 
over medical decisions to individualized physician-patient transactions, while 
increasingly embodying notions of group solidarity and systemic 
interconnectedness in its overall design. The enactment of the PPACA only 
sharpens this tension. Many of the Act’s most important measures reflect the 
principle of group solidarity, yet the Act does little in the near term to alter the 
individualistic diffusion of therapeutic authority. For instance, insurers will be 
restricted in their ability to create thinly sliced risk pools by practicing age- and 
gender-rating and enforcing preexisting-condition exclusions, resulting in 
greater cross-subsidization among participants in private insurance pools.5 The 
4. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1.
5. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201 (defining exclusive permissible rating 
criteria for individual and small group markets).
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individual mandate to purchase insurance will drive more healthy Americans 
into the larger private risk pools where the prices they pay will, in many cases,
be higher than their own age- and health-adjusted actuarial risk6—effectively a 
redistributive tax on youth and good health. On the public finance side, the 
Act’s substantial expansions of Medicaid coverage are funded primarily by 
higher taxes on affluent federal taxpayers, reflecting an unprecedented 
commitment to guarantee coverage for virtually every American below or near 
the poverty line.7 For all of these reasons and more, individualized patient and 
physician choices about utilization will, when aggregated, reverberate through 
an increasingly integrated system struggling with profound concerns about 
cost and quality.
The history of Medicare and private employment-based insurance offers a 
cautionary note about the predictable consequences of such a conceptually 
incoherent system in operation. For several decades now, the simultaneous 
embrace of the health security ideal and traditional therapeutic individualism 
in the Medicare context has been rendered workable only by pouring more and 
more money into the system. In 1960, just before the creation of Medicare and 
Medicaid, total health spending in the United States accounted for only 4.7% 
of GDP.8 Since then, it has more than tripled as a percentage of GDP, to about 
18% in recent estimates.9 This cost growth is not due solely, or even primarily, 
to government largesse—growth in private health insurance costs over the past 
decade has exceeded that of the major public insurance programs. But neither 
public nor private payors have succeeded in containing cost growth. The 
Congressional Budget Office forecasts that, if present trends continue, overall 
health care spending will account for 31% of GDP by 2035, 41% by 2060, and 
49% by 2082.10
This trend is clearly unsustainable and has catalyzed a growing scholarly 
consensus that the individuated diffusion of therapeutic authority in American 
medicine and medical law is problematic from the perspective of both patient 
outcomes and systemic cost. Medical errors remain commonplace in the United 
6. See id. §§ 1501, 10106.
7. See Theda Skocpol & Vanessa Williamson, Obama and the Transformation of U.S. Public 
Policy: The Struggle To Reform Health Care, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1203, 1232 (2011) (describing the 
PPACA as a “bill that draws resources from the privileged in order to spread access to 
affordable health insurance to most of the U.S. citizenry”).
8. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING 5
(2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/11-13-LT-Health.pdf.
9. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, at iii 
(2009).
10. See id. at 12-13.
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States, and many studies suggest that implementing evidence-driven standards 
of care and systems-based approaches would reduce error rates and improve 
outcomes.11 Moreover, the variations in individual treatment protocols 
produced by devolution of medical decisionmaking to the bedside have been 
major drivers of cost increases, particularly when coupled with the moral 
hazard of third-party insurance, which allows individual patients and their 
doctors to shift the costs of their particularized decisions to public or private 
risk pools.12 Many scholars and policymakers, including Peter Orszag, one of 
the chief architects of the PPACA, have called for a shift from individualized 
treatment protocols toward a greater role for evidence-based standards in the 
practice of medicine. To this end, both the stimulus plan and the PPACA 
appropriate large sums for cost-effectiveness research in hopes of generating 
useful aggregate data on best practices, and the PPACA contains some 
provisions designed to increase the awareness and status of evidence-driven 
protocols among the nation’s practicing physicians.13 Other proposals for 
greater incorporation of such data-driven standards in both publicly and 
privately funded insurance plans have proliferated.14
Despite this policy consensus, even tentative efforts at reframing medical 
authority to channel or constrain individualistic discretion are met with fierce 
resistance from the public and providers. Two years ago, when the U.S. 
Preventative Services Task Force promulgated a nonbinding suggestion, 
11. See, e.g., THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE (John E. Wennberg & Megan McAndrew 
Cooper eds., 1998); Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare 
Spending (pt. 2), 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 288, 288 (2003); W. Pete Welch et al., 
Geographic Variation in Expenditures for Physicians’ Services in the United States, 328 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 621, 625-27 (1993); see also INST. OF MED., LEARNING WHAT WORKS BEST: THE 
NATION’S NEED FOR EVIDENCE ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH CARE 2 (2007) 
(arguing for increased use of comparative effectiveness research to improve 
decisionmaking).
12. High-profile examples of this feature of health care delivery abound. Studies have found 
dramatic variations in Medicare cost per patient in different regions of the country, even 
after controlling for all relevant health, population, and price-index variables. See, e.g., 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 8; THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 
11.
13. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6301, 124 Stat. 119, 727 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e (Supp. IV 2011)) (establishing new mechanisms for 
funding and evaluating research on comparative effectiveness). See generally Richard S. 
Saver, Health Care Reform’s Wild Card: The Uncertain Effectiveness of Comparative Effectiveness 
Research, 159 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1690684 (describing the PPACA’s new provision facilitating
research on comparative effectiveness).
14. See Saver, supra note 13 (manuscript at 10-12) (discussing prior private and public efforts to 
promulgate and apply cost-effectiveness analysis, particularly in the 2009 Recovery Act).
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backed by empirical research, that mammograms ought to be prescribed less 
often for healthy women under the age of fifty, the outrage among the public 
and physicians was immediate and intense.15 Within a few days of this 
recommendation’s release, Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen 
Sebelius went to the media expressly to distance herself and the Administration 
from the expert panel and its epistemic assumption that medicine can and 
ought to be partially standardized through rational expert decisionmaking and 
guidelines.16 Calling the task force an “outside independent panel of doctors”
who “do not set federal policy,” Sebelius proclaimed that decisions on 
appropriate breast cancer screening, like other medical decisions, were 
appropriately devolved to the individualized judgment of physicians and 
patients. In words that succinctly capture the deep historical roots of the 
diffuse constitution of medical authority and its keenly individualistic focus, 
Sebelius told the nation’s patients to “[k]eep doing what you have been doing 
for years—talk to your doctor . . . and make the decision that is right for you.”17
ii . america’s health care constitutions and a republic of 
statutes
To what extent can we describe these competing conceptions of medical 
authority and health security as the product of constitutional contestation? The 
theory of constitutionalism laid out in Eskridge and Ferejohn’s A Republic of 
Statutes is powerful and persuasive and, on my reading, capacious enough to 
accommodate a discussion of these two variations of noncanonical 
constitutionalism, neither of which precisely exemplifies their paradigmatic
case of a single transformative superstatute. Both of the constitutions of 
American health care that I discuss here have already met or are capable of 
meeting the functional tests of entrenchment, durability, contestation, and 
public acceptance that Eskridge and Ferejohn describe in their work, although 
neither perfectly fits the authors’ “landmark statute” model.18 The emerging 
constitution of health security comes closest to the Republic of Statutes
15. See, e.g., Joseph Brownstein, Mammogram Recommendations Draw Widespread Anger, ABC
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/OnCallPlusBreastCancerNews/
mammogram-recommendations-meet-widespread-rejection/story?id=9109591.
16. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary Sebelius Statement on 
New Breast Cancer Recommendations (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2009pres/11/20091118a.html.
17. Id.
18. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 26-28 (describing the manner in which 
“superstatutes” resemble rules found in the Constitution).
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paradigm case, though the commitments it embodies are spread across 
numerous statutes enacted in different eras, and today it is too new and too 
tenuously supported to be considered firmly entrenched in the manner of the 
more archetypal “constitutional” enactments that Eskridge and Ferejohn 
discuss.
The older constitution of individuated medical authority exemplifies 
another variety of noncanonical constitutionalism that Eskridge and Ferejohn 
acknowledge but do not explore at length in their book, namely a 
constitutional regime created and entrenched over time by legal forms more 
diverse and multimodal than federal statutes and by institutions more diffuse 
and eclectic than the national legislature and federal bureaucracy (though those 
actors are one part of the story here). This entrenchment has come from the 
bottom up, embodied in over a century of multimodal health law development. 
Such a decentralized method of construction may in this case have produced a 
more durable constitutional edifice: in many respects the long accretion and 
multiple institutional authors of the individualized constitution of medical 
authority have contributed to its present deep entrenchment in popular 
attitudes and professional practice—making it difficult to root out through 
even vigorous programs of national legislative reform. Recent episodes of failed 
reform suggest that something more concerted than periodic federal statutory 
revision is required to unsettle the old constitution of medical authority and 
render it compatible with modern health security imperatives. At the end of 
this Essay, I offer some brief thoughts on that point.
First, however, I will give slightly more detail on the construction, 
operation, and interaction of the two constitutions of American health law. I 
explain the diffuse and formally multifaceted construction of medicine’s 
traditional authority structure and then explore the subsequent interaction of 
this regime with the newer statutory health security model that the PPACA, 
Medicare, and Medicaid advance.
iii . the long construction of the constitution of 
therapeutic individualism
American medicine’s fundamental authority structure is a creature of 
multimodal legal development taking place over two centuries, as common law 
forms, professional state licensure regimes, private institutional ordering, and 
devolutionary constitutional understandings all coalesced to entrench and 
fortify a highly individualistic conception of medical decisionmaking in 
American law and public attitudes. Despite the myriad legal forms and legal 
institutions involved in framing this regime, the common impulse was 
relentlessly centrifugal: therapeutic authority was devolved to and resided in 
the pathologies of american health care
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the most granular level of medical interaction. This long story is summarized 
succinctly here; I explore these developments in much greater detail in a longer 
historical article.19
Central to the individualistic diffusion of medical authority in the United 
States were three basic devolutions of power generated by a coalescence of 
constitutional federalism, weak state licensure regimes, and professional 
eclecticism and resistance to standardization. The first decentralization was a 
product of constitutional federalism, as regulatory power over medicine was 
understood to rest with the states, where it largely remains today. To the 
extent that states regulated medicine at all (and in the nineteenth century, most 
repealed their licensure laws under popular pressure), they in turn delegated 
authority to the profession itself in the form of licensure boards. Finally, the 
medical boards effected a third devolution to individual practitioners through 
their inability or unwillingness to actively monitor or standardize the actual 
practice of medicine. This regime was then locked in place by a set of canonical 
common law doctrines that state courts constructed and applied at the 
nineteenth century’s end, serving to extend and entrench this diffuse authority 
structure throughout the nineteenth century.
Much has been said about the first devolution of American health law, 
driven by early understandings of constitutional federalism. Importantly for 
the later underdevelopment of a federal statutory constitution of health 
security, the primacy of the states in health care matters proved after the New 
Deal transformation to be a more durable structural commitment than the now 
outdated doctrinal limitations on the Federal Commerce Clause authority that 
produced it in the first place. In statutory formation through the past half 
century, the diminished federal role in health care matters has persisted even in 
the absence of formal doctrinal impediments to more robust congressional 
activity. The significant role left for the states in modern statutes like Medicaid 
and the PPACA is a manifestation of this ongoing structural understanding, 
and its implications are ably explored in the paper that Abbe Gluck presented 
at the conference for which this Essay was written.20
This congressional reluctance to exercise the full scope of the federal 
commerce power when legislating on health care matters has even deeper 
historical roots and as such reflects a durable brand of legislative constitutional 
ordering that has differed from the constitutional views of both the judiciary 
19. Theodore W. Ruger, The Centrifugal Constitution of American Health Care (Mar. 2, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
20. Abbe R. Gluck, State Implementation as Federal Statutory Interpretation: A Federalism Agenda 
for the Age of Statutes (and Health Reform), 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with 
author).
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and the executive branch on the same issue. Presidents from John Adams 
forward repeatedly endorsed the national constitutional authority to legislate 
on matters of quarantine and vaccination.21 After Congress refused to act in this 
area through much of the nineteenth century, often on the grounds of a dearth 
of constitutional authority, the Supreme Court in 1886 offered a remarkable bit 
of dicta exhorting Congress to legislate in the field and preclearing the 
legitimacy of such hypothetical federal legislation.22 Still, members of Congress 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to hold a limited 
conception of their own authority over health matters, both expressly in floor 
debates and implicitly in their failure to act.23 In repeatedly adopting a more 
constrained view of federal power over health issues than its coordinate 
branches, Congress has for the past two centuries engaged in the kind of 
unique legislative constitutionalism that Eskridge and Ferejohn describe in the 
context of other lawmaking episodes. But in this area the institutional 
understanding of federal authority was inverted: Congress clung to a narrower 
understanding of federal power than did the Supreme Court or the President. 
The result for health care has been a statutory “constitution” of negation, 
devolution, and underenforced authority at the federal level.
Federal inaction meant that regulatory authority remained vested in state 
governments, and the states either failed to enact any legislation or further 
devolved regulatory authority to the medical profession itself. The earliest 
model was one of absolute nonregulation of medical practice, as popular 
opposition blocked states from enacting even weak licensure regimes. By the 
middle of the nineteenth century, nearly every American state had failed to 
21. See, e.g., President John Adams, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1798), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29440 (positing that the 
national government could legislate on disease control since “contagious sickness may be 
communicated through the channels of commerce”); see also President Thomas 
Jefferson, Fifth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1805), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29447 (opining that the national 
government possessed the authority to enact quarantine laws under its “general commerce” 
authority).
22. See Morgan’s S.S. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 464 (1886) (lamenting that 
Congress had not seen fit to act in the area of quarantines and declaring that “whenever 
Congress shall undertake to provide for the commercial cities of the United States a general 
system of quarantine . . . all State laws on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as the 
two are inconsistent”).
23. See generally Michael Les Benedict, Contagion and the Constitution: Quarantine Agitation from 
1859 to 1866, 25 J. HIST. MED. 177, 177-93 (1970) (noting the minimal federal intervention on 
quarantine and related issues until the nineteenth century’s end); Carleton B. Chapman & 
John M. Talmadge, Historical and Political Background of Federal Health Care Legislation, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1970, at 334, 334-47 (same).
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enact medical licensure laws or repealed them under popular constitutional 
pressure.24
The public arguments against medical licensure laws were framed in 
explicitly “Large ‘C’” Constitutional terms and faintly mirror the defenses of 
individual therapeutic choice that recur in today’s political debates. For 
instance, a Boston editorialist in 1824 claimed:
Any man in the United States has not only a natural right, but a 
constitutional right to employ at pleasure, any person to administer 
medicine to himself or family; and any man has a natural and 
constitutional right to administer, when requested, such medicine as he 
judges best to cure the sick . . . .25
A physician observed contemporaneously that “‘[t]he people regard it among 
their vested interests’ . . . ‘to buy and swallow such physick as they in their 
sovereign will and pleasure shall determine.’”26
Such arguments were embraced by state legislatures and executives in their 
repeal of (or refusal to enact) licensure regimes. For example, Pennsylvania 
never enacted regular licensure legislation because in 1824 the governor vetoed 
the plan, writing in his veto message that “‘the provisions of this bill seem to 
interfere with the undoubted right of our citizens, secured by the constitution 
and laws, to’ . . . ‘employ[] the person, who, in [their] opinion, may be best 
qualified to afford relief to [their] sufferings.’”27
These early nineteenth-century sentiments are instructive for present 
understanding of the therapeutic-individualism constitution in two ways. First, 
they illustrate the manner in which the character of longstanding constitutional 
structures can toggle between canonical “Large ‘C’” constitutionalism and 
24. See JOSEPH F. KETT, THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL PROFESSION: THE ROLE OF 
INSTITUTIONS, 1780-1860, at 13 (1968) (listing specific state repeals and noting that 
“[w]ithin the space of little more than a decade [after 1830], however, nearly every state had 
repealed its penalties on unlicensed practitioners”).
25. An Attempt To Infringe upon the Constitution of the United States Defeated: Or Real 
Republicanism, MEDICAL NEWS-PAPER; OR THE DOCTOR AND THE PHYSICIAN (Boston), Feb. 
15, 1824, at 1.
26. JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PATENT 
MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 52 (1961) (quoting an unnamed New 
York doctor).
27. Governor John Andrew Shulze, Veto Message (Dec. 8, 1824), reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA 
ARCHIVES, PAPERS OF THE GOVERNORS 1817-1832, at 543 (4th ser. 1900). As was typical of the 
nonjudicial constitutional discourse of the era, Shulze’s veto statement did not cite a specific 
constitutional clause or even necessarily distinguish between state and federal documents in 
making the constitutional objections.
the yale law journal online 120:347 2011
356
noncanonical constitutionalism. For a brief period in the early nineteenth 
century, debates over government control of therapeutic authority played out 
in explicitly constitutional terms, especially among the predominant 
constitutional institutions of the time: state legislatures and state governors. 
Today the vernacular of therapeutic individualism has become untethered from 
the judicialized forms of canonical constitutionalism; people still claim a vague 
“right” to therapeutic choice of doctor or treatment and act on understandings 
of that right in both the public and private spheres, but such claims are rarely
linked to formal doctrinal or textual constitutional arguments in the way they 
once were.
Second, these early bruising licensure battles help explain the weak nature 
of the medical licensure regimes that arose at the end of the nineteenth century 
and persisted through the twentieth. Constitutional federalism gave states 
original regulatory authority, and in turn states delegated power to license 
individual physicians to the profession itself. But professional leaders were 
reluctant to attempt to standardize practice and provoke another round of 
popular resistance, and so the medical boards that arose after 1870 effectively 
worked a third devolution of therapeutic authority down to the level of the 
individual physician. Though state boards set criteria for admission to practice 
and policed the unlicensed practice of medicine by outsiders, they did
extremely little to regulate practice among those doctors who possessed the 
requisite credentials.28 The profession was “self-regulated” only at the ex ante 
juncture of the right to exclude—medical boards had neither the conceptual 
mandate nor the institutional resources or competency to smooth out practice 
variations among already-licensed practitioners. Unlike strong-form guild 
regulation with authority over day-to-day standards and practices, medical 
boards operated as merely a boundary mechanism to police the broad outer 
limits of medical legitimacy.
Together, these three devolutions coalesced to produce an authority regime 
at the nineteenth century’s end that was highly diffuse and individuated. As 
one contemporary physician said in objecting to a proposed American Medical 
Association ethical requirement that would have precluded consultation with 
irregularly trained physicians, “There can be in medicine no heresy, because 
there is no orthodoxy.”29 Once in place, this thrice-devolved authority regime 
28. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 286-87 (2010) (discussing criticism of state medical boards for 
“failing to discipline dangerous physicians, and generally being lax in their oversight duties 
at the expense of a vulnerable public” (footnote omitted)).
29. John Harley Warner, Ideals of Science and Their Discontents in Late Nineteenth-Century 
American Medicine, 82 ISIS 454, 466 (1991).
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was entrenched through most of the twentieth century by a myriad of health 
law doctrines that courts began to employ and frame over one hundred years 
ago.
The common law doctrines that state courts applied from the late 
nineteenth century onward reflect courts’ eclectic borrowing and modification 
from fields of tort, contract, fiduciary duty, and others, creating what one 
scholar has called a “chaotic, dysfunctional patchwork.”30 Nonetheless, it is 
conceptually possible to lump broad swaths of health law’s traditional canon 
into two general functional clusters. In the first basket are first-order specificity 
rules, which articulated and enforced legal doctrines that encouraged and 
protected therapeutic individuation. For instance, the customary standard of 
care in medical malpractice was in fact an amalgam of multiple standards of 
care, with courts permitting meaningful therapeutic variation along variables 
such as type of medical training, mode of practice, geographic location, and 
other factors.31 Thinly-sliced liability rules (such as the “locality rule,” an 
invention of American common law never adopted in English law) permitted 
doctors to practice medicine differently from physicians in other towns in the 
same state.32 Even to the present day, medical liability rules have worked 
reasonably well to shift costs and compensate patients in cases of clear mistakes 
but have done little or nothing to promote optimal methods of care as between 
various therapeutic alternatives.33
A second set of legal doctrines operated primarily to preserve therapeutic 
individualization indirectly, though no less significantly, by blocking or 
trumping forms of private ordering that might otherwise have exerted a 
standardizing influence on medical authority. Courts framed and employed 
30. M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 247, 321 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 965 (Pa. 1992) (“A medical practitioner has an 
absolute defense to a claim of negligence when . . . the prescribed treatment or procedure 
has been approved by one group of medical experts even though an alternate school of 
thought recommends another approach.”).
32. See Jon R. Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408, 410 (1969) (describing the locality rule’s origins and 
noting that “the English courts never developed such a principle”). For early cases 
developing the rule, see, for example, Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872); Tefft v. 
Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870); and Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt. 557 (1876).
33. Several recent medical malpractice reform proposals seek to alter this dynamic, for instance 
by expressly incorporating evidence-based standards as safe harbors against malpractice 
liability, as was done in the Maine Medical Liability Demonstration Project. See Timothy K. 
Mackey & Bryan A. Liang, The Role of Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 13 
VIRTUAL MENTOR 36, 38-39 (2011), available at http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/
2011/01/pdf/hlaw1-1101.pdf.
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doctrines such as the prohibition on “corporate practice of medicine” to 
preserve the traditional diffuse structures of medical authority against 
incursion from new organizational forms of private control, particularly the 
rise of the corporation in the late nineteenth-century United States and the 
nonprofit hospital in the twentieth. Such trumping rules were actively sought 
by doctors and willingly extended by common law courts, with the result that 
the practice of medicine developed and expanded without meaningful public or 
private control for much of the twentieth century.
Throughout the century, observers noted the pernicious policy effects of 
these displacing rules. A Yale Law Journal commenter presciently declared in 
1938 that the prohibition on institutional control of physicians stifled 
“extensive experimentation with methods of medical organization” that was 
undertaken in an “[e]ffort[] to obtain adequate medical care at reasonable 
costs.”34 Mark Hall wrote much more recently that the rule against corporate 
employment of physicians was a “puzzling doctrine . . . clouded with confused 
reasoning and . . . founded on an astounding series of logical fallacies,” and he 
comprehensively cataloged the doctrine’s “long history of suppressing needed 
innovation” throughout the twentieth century.35 The core doctrines of 
American health law did not create the original diffusion of authority in 
nineteenth-century medicine, but they were instrumental in calcifying and 
extending that individuated authority regime throughout the twentieth 
century. Although most of these doctrines have been modified or abandoned 
by state courts in recent decades, they did more than enough work earlier in 
the century to lock in the basic regime of medical authority that persists today.
Finally, the mid-twentieth century’s most important doctrinal innovation 
relative to physician authority did nothing to alter the general diffusion of 
health care decisions, even as it worked a sea change in the relative power 
balance between physicians and patients. Legal scholars, ethicists, and common 
law judges coalesced after 1960 to articulate a new emphasis on informed 
patient consent and the cognate principle that medical decisionmaking ought 
to be shared between doctor and patient rather than dictated by the former.36
34. See Note, Right of Corporation To Practice Medicine, 48 YALE L.J. 346, 346-47 (1938).
35. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost 
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 510-11 (1988) (noting specific episodes of hospital and 
insurance industry innovation at different periods in the twentieth century that were 
thwarted by judicial invocation of the doctrine and lamenting that “courts were entirely 
unresponsive in tempering” its dampening effect on innovation).
36. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
(1986) (describing historical legal rules and medical practice and twentieth-century 
changes); see also Kristin Madison, Patients as “Regulators”? Patients’ Evolving Influence over 
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This produced a crucial shift in health law doctrine and worked a dramatic 
legal and normative change in the relationships between physicians and 
patients. Yet the real legal changes fostered by the informed consent ideal did 
nothing to reduce the diffuse character of medical decisionmaking in the 
United States. Medical decisions were now binary rather than unitary but 
remained devolved to the most particularized level of the delivery system.
iv. constitutional coexistence and conflict:  the uneasy 
and incomplete rise of the health security 
constitution
The longitudinal developments described above firmly entrenched the 
constitution of therapeutic individualism in American law, public attitudes, 
and professional practice by the time the federal government entered the health 
care field. Twentieth-century efforts to frame a meaningful constitution of 
health security by incrementally expanding Americans’ access to private or 
public health insurance necessarily confronted this existing authority regime, 
and the older model has remained dominant even as the two constitutional 
visions increasingly coexist uneasily in federal law and health system 
organization. It is possible to sketch a rough typology of three modalities of 
interaction between these two conceptions of health constitutionalism.
In the first mode of interaction, the entrenched regime of medical 
individualism exerts an absolute trumping or blocking effect on proposed 
extensions of health insurance security. This manifested earliest in the private 
sector, as common law rules derived from the imperative of therapeutic 
individualism, like the bar on institutional “practice of medicine” in the early 
1900s, blocked innovative arrangements that would have extended access to 
medical care to more Americans in that era.37 In the public sphere, on several 
notable occasions throughout the past hundred years, public initiatives to 
meaningfully expand health coverage failed in the national legislature (if they 
were proposed at all) based in large part on resistance from patients and 
physicians to any perceived threat to, or reordering of, the diffuse structures of 
medical authority.38 The entrenched public backing of medical individualism 
Health Care Delivery, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 9 (2010) (describing midcentury changes in doctrine 
and therapeutic practice). But cf. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J.
899, 933-37 (1994) (questioning whether informed consent as practiced matches the “law in 
the books”).
37. See Note, supra note 34, at 346-47.
38. See, e.g., Jonathan Oberlander, Perspective, Learning from Failure in Health Care Reform, 357 
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1677 (2007).
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has provided a rich and reliable vein of normative support that opponents can 
invoke to block the momentum of reform efforts.
This dynamic was on full display in the 1990s, when a broad majority of 
Americans initially favored the sweeping reforms of the health care system 
proposed by President Clinton. The Clinton initiative provoked huge levels of 
countervailing political advertising that heavily stressed the specter of 
bureaucratic intrusion into the physician-patient relationship.39 Polling data 
suggests that these invocations of medicine’s traditional authority regime had 
significant traction. Within a twelve-month period, support for the President’s 
plan fell from 71% to 43%.40 Mining similar themes, in last year’s political 
battle over health reform, Republican pollster Frank Luntz built on opinion 
surveys to recommend that opponents of the PPACA make as their central 
message the threat to traditional medical autonomy that the new statute would 
pose and to stand by the mantra that “[g]overnment should not stand between 
the patient and the physician.”41
Beyond the trumping effect that the regime of therapeutic individualism 
has exerted over health security proposals on many occasions in the past 
century, a second dynamic relevant to current policy formation implicates 
constitutional coexistence and pluralism. Even where statutes and private 
ordering have succeeded in implementing a partial health security constitution, 
the form and operation of those statutes have been built around the older 
constitution of medical authority. Major federal statutory interventions like the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act42 in 1938 and the enactment of Medicare and 
Medicaid in 196543 expressly disclaimed federal authority over the actual 
practice of medicine even while expanding federal authority in crucial ways 
over the safety and security of the medical system.
For instance, Congress disclaimed any intent to regulate medical practice 
despite becoming a major funder of new hospitals in the Hill-Burton Act in the 
1940s, which provided that “nothing in this title shall be construed as 
conferring on any Federal officer or employee the right to exercise any 
39. See, e.g., Harry and Louise (Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. television advertisement 1993), available 
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dt31nhleeCg.
40. See Robert J. Blendon, Mollyann Brodie & John Benson, What Happened to Americans’ 
Support for the Clinton Health Plan?, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1995, at 7, 8-9.
41. FRANK I. LUNTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF HEALTHCARE 20 (2009) (using the language of Senator 
John Kyl).
42. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399b (2006)).
43. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.).
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supervision or control over the administration, personnel, maintenance, or 
operation of any hospital with respect to which any funds have been or may be 
expended under this title.”44 Likewise, the Medicare statute commits the 
federal government as the guarantor of medical access for older Americans and 
others but nonetheless states that “[n]othing in this title shall be construed to 
authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control 
over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are 
provided.”45
Unsurprisingly, federal administrative behavior has historically embraced 
this conceptual duality and unease about unsettling the traditional medical 
authority regime. While a succession of federal agencies gave health security to 
tens of millions of retirees in the administration of Medicare, they refused to 
define the basic benefit standard of “medical necessity” or otherwise exert 
systematic control over the delivery of health care by doctors and hospitals. To 
this day, the agencies in charge of Medicare reimbursement have not issued 
regulations about which procedures will be considered reimbursable, largely 
delegating such determinations to treating physicians. Medicare has operated 
as a national health security statute wrapped around an individuated authority 
regime, casting the federal government as a payor for services while diffusing 
actual therapeutic choice to individual physicians. In this sense, the oft-mocked 
chant of “Keep your government hands off my Medicare!”46 heard at Tea Party 
rallies is, in fact, a fair description of Medicare’s bifurcated architecture, even if 
it is a disastrous policy prescription going forward. Medicare, and to a great 
extent the new PPACA, consciously and perilously seek to juggle the two 
opposing conceptions of health care constitutionalism with the predictable 
consequence of systemic incoherence papered over only by throwing ever more 
money at the problem.
A similar systemic incongruity applies to the private-sector health 
insurance regime as it has developed since the World War II era. This private,
employment-based insurance system forms a core part of the overall 
constitution of health security in the United States; employers have been the 
primary insurers for most Americans over the past half century and remain so 
today even as that model is under severe strain from escalating medical costs.47
44. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 635, 60 Stat. 1040, 1049 
(1946).
45. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 290, 291 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006)).
46. See, e.g., Timothy Noah, The Medicare-Isn’t-Government Meme, SLATE (Aug. 5, 2009, 2:04 
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2224350.
47. Federal legislation and administrative regulation were crucial causal drivers behind the 
growth of this private-sector regime at midcentury. Most notable was the favorable federal 
the yale law journal online 120:347 2011
362
This private-sector developmental story makes clear that there is no easy 
market-based solution to the conceptual clash between health security and 
therapeutic individualism. To the contrary, the popular constitution of 
therapeutic individualism is at least as entrenched against private reordering as 
it is against federal statutory revision, with analogous cost consequences.
Although insurance contracts have typically been drafted to give insurers 
the right to refuse to fund treatments that are not “medically necessary,” until 
recently insurers rarely second-guessed the decisions of treating physicians.48
The most important private insurance plans were for decades “wedded to a 
vision of themselves as mere financing intermediaries bound to give effect to 
any doctor’s prescription.”49 And in rare instances where insurers did initially 
deny coverage for unnecessary procedures, they were frequently rebuffed in 
that endeavor by courts receptive to patient and physician claims of authority. 
Courts steadfastly embraced therapeutic individualism in such rulings, 
explaining for instance that “[o]nly the treating physician can determine what 
the appropriate treatment should be” and that “[a]ny other standard would 
involve intolerable second-guessing” by third-party payors.50
The deep entrenchment of the individualistic authority regime against even 
concerted efforts at private reordering was laid bare in the resounding collapse 
of the managed care movement of the past decade. For a period following the 
demise of the Clinton plan in 1994, many health policy scholars and industry 
analysts put great faith in the growth of managed care delivery systems, which 
sought to centralize care management through prospective utilization review, 
payment reform, and in some cases direct employment of physicians. Many 
insurance companies made huge investment-backed strategic decisions to 
position themselves for the new era of managed care, and for a time private 
payors succeeded in flattening the health care cost curve by controlling 
physician and hospital treatment patterns.51 Yet, despite neither regulation nor 
tax treatment for employer-provided health benefits, a massive tax expenditure that remains 
crucial today. Also spurring the rise of employer-provided insurance were World War II-era 
price controls that froze wages but not benefits, leading manufacturing employers to 
compete for scarce workers with lucrative benefit packages. See David Blumenthal, 
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins and Implications, 355 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006).
48. See Hall, supra note 35, at 469 (describing the “historical reluctance” of insurers to base 
reimbursement denials on lack of medical necessity).
49. Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M.P. King, Liver Transplantation in Massachusetts: Public 
Policymaking as Morality Play, 19 IND. L. REV. 955, 965-66 (1986).
50. Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1016 (Civ. Ct. 1966).
51. See James C. Robinson, From Managed Care to Consumer Health Insurance: The Fall and Rise 
of Aetna, 23 HEALTH AFF. 43, 44 (2004).
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restriction from the federal government and only weak and incomplete legal 
responses from the states, strong-form managed care practiced by large 
insurers in the 1990s collapsed resoundingly, largely due to intense patient and 
physician opposition.52
The demise of managed care at the end of the twentieth century 
underscores the ongoing trumping effect of the constitution of therapeutic 
individualism over innovative private ordering, as well as public statutory 
reform. This in turn illustrates one feature of the operation of entrenched 
noncanonical constitutionalism: it is more elastic than the constitution 
contained in formal doctrine, and it operates without categorical distinctions 
like the “state action” limitation of canonical constitutional law. Public 
resistance was deployed against managed care insurers in the 1990s just as it 
had been against President Clinton’s health plan a few years before.
v. the ppaca and the health security constitution
The PPACA enters the field of play at a time when the tension between 
therapeutic individualism and universal health security is becoming 
increasingly pointed due to cost growth and demographic factors. The 
extension of the health security constitution envisaged by the PPACA can occur 
only with greater elements of systemic solidarity and institutional control than 
have heretofore been possible in light of the deeply held individuation norm. 
The controversial “individual mandate” is part of this solidarity principle; even 
more important are latent devices encouraged by the bill to change payment 
and delivery structures to reduce systemic costs by standardizing and 
institutionalizing the delivery of health care. But all of these measures conflict 
with the older health constitution of absolute individual choice, and where that 
conceptual clash surfaces as express political debate, public opinion has 
consistently favored the traditional allocation of authority.
If there is a way out of this constitutional impasse, what is needed is a third 
mode of interaction between the new constitution of health security and the 
older structures of therapeutic individualism. Overly blunt efforts at systemic 
reorganization, like the major changes proposed by the Clinton reform 
initiative or the aggressive managed care initiatives from private insurers in the 
1990s, will founder under the still-powerful trumping effect exerted by popular 
embrace of therapeutic individualism. The second model of statutory 
accommodation and subservience illustrated by the Medicare program’s public 
underwriting of diffuse medical decisionmaking similarly fails to provide a 
52. See id. at 44-45.
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solution to this impasse. The old constitution of individualized authority must 
yield somewhat to the new imperatives of health security and systemic 
solidarity, but new methods are required to avoid a conflict between the two 
regimes.
On this point, the most encouraging new ideas put forth in sections of the 
PPACA involve innovative payment structures that seek to indirectly shape the 
behavior of individual providers by creating incentives that align with optimal 
utilization patterns.53 Given the deep entrenchment of the individuated 
therapeutic control model, the most promising approaches in the immediate 
term seek to reform physician payment to indirectly reduce costs and increase 
standardization. Many of these payment reforms seek to shift from pure “fee 
for service” reimbursement, where every single test or procedure generates 
physician income, to more holistic or bundled payments ranging from payment 
“per episode of care” all the way to the payment of an annual capitated fee for 
each patient a physician cares for.54 The hope is that such payment models will 
directly achieve cost savings and indirectly produce more standardized care by 
incentivizing physicians to seek the most efficient and high-quality methods of 
care.
Most importantly from the perspective of avoiding conflict with entrenched 
authority structures in medicine, payment reform seeks to change behavior 
without reordering the superficial structures of medical authority. By enlisting 
(or conscripting) individual treating physicians in the cost-control enterprise, 
payment reform does not unsettle the longstanding form of the treatment 
interaction in the way that direct managed care utilization review did, even as it 
shifts key incentives behind the scenes. Shifting underlying payment incentives 
while asking physicians to continue making case-based therapeutic decisions 
conscripts doctors as agents for systemic change, providing them responsibility 
not only for patient outcomes and autonomy but also for broader quality and 
cost concerns. It is unclear whether physicians will willingly take up such a 
function, though evidence suggests that even physicians are belatedly realizing 
the importance of moving away from the older, highly individuated authority 
model.
In sum, a deep clash between the solidaristic vision central to the emerging 
health security constitution and the individuated regime of medical authority 
53. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3401-3403, 124 Stat. 
119, 480-507 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395b-6 to 1395yy (Supp. IV 2011)) 
(addressing Medicare cost control through payment restrictions).
54. See, e.g., Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways To Pay for Health Care, 28 
HEALTH AFF. 1418 (2009); Meredith B. Rosenthal, Beyond Pay for Performance—Emerging 
Models of Provider-Payment Reform, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197 (2008).
the pathologies of american health care
365
that has been entrenched over two centuries has been revealed, and it will 
intensify in the future. For the health security constitution to be fully realized 
and made sustainable, it must prevail over the prerogatives of the traditional 
medical authority structure that is firmly entrenched in American law and 
public opinion. Both constitutions will continue to coexist for the foreseeable 
future, but through innovation in payment structures, it may be possible to 
convert the wide diffusion of medical authority into an engine for reform 
rather than permitting it to serve as an impediment to change.
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